We cannot hope to provide a complete and comprehensive education about election machines on this single page. Instead, our aim is to outline some of the primary concerns and direct you to resources where you can learn more.

Nearly all electronic voting machines are manufactured by corporations. By definition, corporations are beholden to shareholders for whom they must provide a return on investment (profit). Election outcomes can have a great bearing on potential profits which creates an inherent conflict of interest for corporations providing voting technology for public use. When that technology is called "proprietary" and is shielded from public review, votes are being counted in secret and we are asked to accept results based on blind trust. There is no rational basis for confidence in the results reported under such conditions. This premise is central to the Voter Confidence Resolution.

Concerns over corporate claims of proprietary privilege have been around for a while. Near the end of 2005 this particular concern escalated with revelations about "interpreted code." This refers to computer programming that translates information from a human-readable format into a unique programming language that each corporation shields from public scrutiny under the proprietary claim. Once "interpreted" into this secret language, the data is no longer readable by humans. At this point, any correlation between the secret data and the reported election results can only be accepted with blind trust, necessarily creating inconclusive outcomes that will not receive unanimous acceptance from the public.

What is more, interpreted code is expressly prohibited by section 4.2.2 of the 2002 Federal Voting System Standards and Guidelines. In California, compliance with these regulations is a condition required for state certification, the process by which the Secretary of State grants machine-specific approval for use. In February 2006, CA SoS Bruce McPherson granted conditional certification to Diebold voting machines despite the presence of interpreted code. This has resulted in a lawsuit (.pdf) brought by VoterAction.org on behalf of voters throughout the state.

The contested presidential election of 2000 brought unprecedented scrutiny to the election process. The premise of "no basis for confidence in the results reported" can be traced back to the post-election period of uncertainty when it was unclear who won or on what basis the victory would be determined. Congress then passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), ushering in an era of election administration being outsourced to corporations, sometimes partisan, sometimes foreign-owned, and sometimes even owned by a Senator. Under pressure from HAVA, counties around the country feel pressured to spend money, some provided through Congressional funding, to feed the coffers of the conflicted election machine manufacturers who would provide secret and unverifiable voting equipment. How has this worked out?